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The United States Navy has a number of entities that work together to ensure that 
aircraft in the Navy are supplied with the parts and materials required to maintain mission 
readiness. An analysis of the operating and support system costs characterizes cost variance 
across organizational-, intermediate-, and depot-level maintenance. In this report, we 
examine both labor and material cost for both repairable and consumable items and 
categorize those costs by type of maintenance action. This analysis is intended to help in the 
development of a cost model that could aid in both budget planning and execution. 
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As professional aviation maintenance officers, we wanted to pursue a topic that 
would benefit our entire community. Supporting aviation maintenance involves a balance 
of funding, manpower, and logistics. Parts and materials directly affect all three. 
Understanding how parts and materials influence our supply systems, troops, and drive 
cost is the key to identifying weaknesses and the first step to process improvements, 
which, in turn, can reduce labor hours and lead-times and save money. By analyzing the 
data of a component with a high failure rate, and in turn, a high utilization rate, we hoped 
a large amount of statistically significant data would be available that could be used to 
answer the following questions. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
By analyzing the current data-collecting systems utilized by the Department of 
Defense (DoD), can naval aviation accurately predict proper inventories, safety stocks, 
and costs associated with organizational- and intermediate-level maintenance? 
Are the current data systems capturing the necessary data to make cost-effective 
maintenance decisions at the organizational and intermediate (O&I) levels? 
If not, what data fields should be added? 
What can be done to improve data collection? 
C. EXAMINING ORGANIZATIONAL-, INTERMEDIATE-, AND DEPOT-
LEVEL MAINTENANACE COSTS 
1. Organizational-Level Maintenance 
Organizational-level (O-level) maintenance is performed by the maintenance 
personnel assigned to the operational unit or squadron. A squadron is a mix of officer and 
enlisted personnel, each assigned to a specific assignment or billet. A Service member is 
required to have the appropriate level of training and/or the Navy-enlisted classification 
(NEC)/designator/military occupational specialty (MOS). The NECs and training 
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standards are required to ensure mission readiness and are governed by Naval Personnel 
Command (NAVPERS). NAVPERS determines the required levels of training, 
qualifications, and the number of personnel for assignment. This is calculated utilizing 
the documented number of work hours performed, and the mission of the squadron or 
unit determines the manning levels and training requirements. The mission of O-level 
maintenance at a squadron is to maintain all assigned aircraft and associated aeronautical 
equipment in a full mission-capable status. Other duties associated with this process are 
improving the local maintenance process, standing watches, and performing other 
required duties. All of these tasks feed the manning requirements for size and 
determining costs (Department of the Navy [DoN], 2012). 
O-level maintenance can be grouped into three main categories: scheduled, 
unscheduled, and technical directive compliance.  Scheduled maintenance is the 
primary form of maintenance performed at the O-level. Scheduled maintenance is 
designed to prolong and improve the life and performance of the system being serviced. 
Engineers with intimate knowledge of these systems determine the design and schedule 
of this type of maintenance. Some tasks are established at the birth of the system, while 
others are implemented as they are identified. Unscheduled maintenance occurs when 
systems unexpectedly fail and require repair and/or replacement of good components. 
Technical directives (TDs) are implemented when trends occur and/or safe-for-flight 
concerns are raised. Most TDs are inspection based, but some require the removal and 
replacement of suspected faulty components. TDs are a preemptive approach to 
preventing catastrophic failure (DoN, 2012). 
2. Intermediate-Level Maintenance 
Intermediate-level (I-level) maintenance is the next level of support. I-level 
maintenance personnel are assigned to a ship-based aircraft intermediate maintenance 
department (AIMD) or a shore-based fleet readiness center (FRC). I-level maintenance is 
designed to provide a higher level of maintenance support, with improved capabilities to 
repair and test components. AIMDs and FRCs are capable of providing support to 
multiple type/model/series (TMS) of aircraft. Pooling these resources allows the Navy to 
save money and improve the readiness of O-level maintenances. I-level commands are 
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responsible for receiving parts, assessing the condition of the components, and 
determining the necessary action. Depending on priority and availability, parts are 
repaired and returned to the squadron for installation and use on the aircraft or for 
induction into the supply system. Parts that are beyond capability of maintenance (BCM) 
are shipped to the appropriate depot-level maintenance activity or to the manufacturer. 
Among the Sailors and Marines that work in I-level facilities, civilian artisans are 
contracted to provide expert support and technical expertise, not only to repair 
components but also to train personnel. These artisans improve the capabilities of the I-
level command and contribute to the professional development of Service members. Just 
as the O-level duties of the Service members vary, the work performed determines the 
manning of the AIMD or FRC and contributes to the cost of supporting a system. 
Artisans in AIMDs and FRCs also represent a cost of support (DoN, 2012). 
O- and I-level activity Service members share O- and I-level maintenance duties. 
This provides rotational assignments for Service members to complete sea/shore 
rotations, as well as to gain valuable O- and I-level maintenance experience (DoN, 2012). 
3. Depot-Level Maintenance 
Depot-level maintenance includes naval aviation industrial establishments and 
commercial facilities. Depot repair consists of aircraft overhauls, rebuilding and repairing 
of parts, assemblies, subassemblies, and any other system that falls outside of the 
capabilities of the O- and I-level maintenance departments. Depot-level maintenance 
represents another level of costs associated with the operations and support of systems. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BACKGROUND 
1. F/A-18 Hornet and Super Hornet 
Developed in the 1970s as a multi-role, all-weather, supersonic, twin-engine, 
carrier-based aircraft, the F/A-18 (Fighter/Attack) Hornet is a product of the combined 
efforts from McDonnell Douglas and Northrop Grumman. Its multi-role capability made 
it a versatile weapons system and set the stage for the F/A-18 Super Hornet. Flying its 
first flight in 1995, the F/A-18 Super Hornet was designed to replace the F-14 Tomcat. 
The F/A-18 family consisted of A, B, C, D, E, F, and G series, all of which were 
variations of the same aircraft, with the major differences being single- or double-seated 
cockpits and variations in fuel capacity. Each new series of aircraft incorporated 
upgraded radar systems, avionics, and weapon-carrying capability. These variations 
helped tailor each series to a specific set of mission capabilities. The F/A-18 family of 
aircraft eventually replaced the F-14 Tomcat, A-6 Intruder, S-3 Viking, and EA-6B 
Prowler. With a single platform performing multiple roles, the F/A-18 provided an 
opportunity to drastically improve logistics support. For example, imagine seven TMS of 
aircraft on an aircraft carrier with each aircraft consisting of two types of tiers. To support 
these aircraft, the aircraft carrier must maintain an adequate number of tiers to ensure the 
full mission capability of its fleet of aircraft. Now, imagine if there were only three TMS 
of aircraft. The number and variety of parts and materials required to sustain carrier-
based flight operations is drastically reduced (United States Navy, 2009). 
2. Generator Converter Unit 
The F/A-18 Super Hornet’s generator converter unit (GCU) has experienced 
increased demand; changing system utilization is a common theme for many system 
components operated by the fighting forces in the DoD. Estimating the ever-changing 
utilization rates associated with a component and determining the strain and wear 
imposed is a challenge that the DoD faces. This information is critical when determining 
the mean time between failure (MTBF) and, in turn, the reliability of the weapon system. 
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The GCU is similar to the alternator in a vehicle. It takes mechanical energy produced by 
the jet engines of the F/A-18 and converts that into electrical energy for the appropriate 
systems of the aircraft to operate. Without a properly operating GCU, the F/A-18 cannot 
complete its mission. Currently, the GCU is the number one AVDLR and readiness 
degrader for the F/A-18 community. As subsystems of larger weapon systems are 
upgraded, changed, and integrated, the effects of these changes are felt on other 
components that operate together to make the entire system function. The GCU is a great 
example of this: higher electrical loads and higher demands on the aircraft’s electrical 
systems are a result of components being removed and replaced by new ones to support 
the avionics that the aircraft utilizes, and failures of the GCU can be attributed to the 
change in its utilization. Figure 1 illustrates a time stamp when the new radar system, 
Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA), was installed and its demand placed on the 
GCU in 2005 compared to the current utilization. The utilization change is illustrated by 
the volts and currents that the system handles; the white strip represents the old radar 
system; and the gray strip represents the new demands after the new AESA was installed.   
 
 
Figure 1.   Generator Converter Unit’s Current Utilization 
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Strains applied to the current system have caused the MTBF of the GCU to 
decrease. The new demand placed on the GCU is much higher than the original demand. 
Failure to correctly estimate the reliability and life of a system is extremely costly and, in 
some cases, dangerous to the operators of the system (Naval Air Systems Command 
[NAVAIR], 2010). 
3. Level of Repair Analysis 
Level of repair analysis (LORA) is an analytical method to be used in determining 
the appropriate level of maintenance. LORA follows a series of steps that takes inputs, 
such as reliability of the system, maintainability, physical dimensions, weight, and so 
forth. Those inputs are then used to determine the optimal provisions of repair and 
maintenance facilities in order to reduce life-cycle cost and increase operational 
readiness. LORA helps solve problems as simple as how to avoid paying hundreds of 
dollars on transportation charges for a single $20 part or how to organize and staff an I-
level facility. LORA is also responsible for determining the appropriate level to repair 
and/or to dispose of high-cost, repairable items by creating cost benefit analyses at each 
level, starting at the O-level and working its way up (DoN, 2003). 
4. Maintenance Data Systems 
The maintenance data systems (MDSs) were created to enhance naval aviation by 
tracking different maintenance actions and their effects on diverse elements of naval 
aviation. The Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP; DoN, 2012) describes MDS 
as a system that “furnishes data products that provide management tools for the efficient 
and economical management of maintenance organizations” (p. 14.1.1).   Maintenance 
organizations, such as I-level and O-level, are responsible for the proper incorporation of 
data that is uploaded into the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) on databases such as 
Aviation Financial Analysis Support Tool (AFAST) and Decision Knowledge 
Programming for Logistics Analysis and Technical Evaluation (DECKPLATE) via MDS. 
The final data should be usable as a management information system data source tool for 
all levels of management in questions related to 
 equipment reliability and maintainability, 
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 material usage, and 
 maintenance material cost expenditure. 
MDS is the beginning of a series of building blocks that presents the big picture 
of maintenance, how much it really costs, and where the manager can find areas of 
interest in order to implement change or make an educated decision in order to better the 
system (DoN, 2012). Currently, AFAST is widely utilized by the fleet as the preferred 
method to track and monitor spending throughout different operational commands. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Every year, the DoN has to make decisions about the annual budget. These 
decisions are heavily based on readiness and modernization, two of the four pillars of 
military capabilities. According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), readiness 
is “the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed,” while 
modernization is “technical sophistication of all the elements of the force” (Tyszkiewicz 
& Daggett, 1998, p. 265). 
To put it in simple terms, the DoD budget takes into account the factors of 
sustaining current capabilities and supporting the incorporation of new capabilities. The 
link between those two pillars, our research, and the way the DoD budgets in the present 
economic situation is operating and support (O&S). The goal of this project is to identify 
the cost of O&S throughout the maintenance cycle, and focusing on a component, such as 
the GCU, will help capture the data. We believe that by identifying more, if not all, of the 
costs associated with O&S, better maintenance decisions can be made and the DoD can 
improve the way it budgets in order to better sustain readiness throughout the fleet and 
also plan for the future. 
1. Current Cost/Expenditure System Used by the Navy 
Unger (2009) depicted the relationship between multiple systems’ expenditure 
patterns, flying hours, and fleet sizes. In his work, Unger recognized the complexity of 
the system and acknowledged that there are different costs; some are affected by flying 
hours, some by fleet sizes, and others by a complicated mix of the two or sometimes one 
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and not the other. Additionally, Unger (2009) explained that the mixed cases appeared to 
be a manifestation of fixed-plus-variable cost structure, which is not constantly 
compatible with the traditional Air Force cost per flight hour (CPFH) program. Unger 
(2009) addressed the current categories by which costs are separated and presented to 
higher echelons for review during budgetary processes. Table 1 shows the expenditure 
category elements as described by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost 
Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG). 
Table 1.   CAIG Costs 
(Unger, 2009, p. 2) 
 
 
The Secretary of the Air Force, Financial Management (SAF/FM) directorate 
developed a category cost element different from the CAIG’s. The intention is to account 
for “the variable with flying hour,” “variable with tails,” and “fixed” costs (Unger, 2009). 
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The original concept was later changed after the report analysis yielded new, unexpected 
results between variations in different levels or stages, especially at the depot level. Table 
2 is the Air Force expenditure category scheme that resulted from the analysis. 
Table 2.   Alternative Air Force Expenditure Categorization Scheme 
(Unger, 2009, p. 26) 
 
 
Unger (2009) provided us with a platform from which efforts could be oriented by 
following some of the work conducted by the Air Force and comparing it to the current 
cost/expenditure system utilized by the Navy. Because our current research was designed 
to identify factors that affect O&S, we usefully applied a methodology similar to that 
used by Unger, which also  made cost comparisons across Services easier. 
2. Making Accurate Cost Decisions 
According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report dated July 20, 
2010, the DoD cannot effectively manage and reduce O&S costs for most of the weapon 
systems that the GAO reviews. The GAO analyzed and compared life-cycle O&S cost 
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estimates and historical data on actual O&S costs. The GAO found that five of the seven 
aviation systems reviewed did not have the life-cycle O&S cost estimates developed at 
production milestones and that the data used to calculate costs was incomplete. 
Incomplete and insufficient data forced the DoD to make inaccurate calculations when 
determining O&S costs. Providing accurate data, the ability to analyze the rate of O&S 
cost growth, identifying cost drivers, and developing plans for managing and controlling 
costs are essential for the successful calculation of O&S costs. Updating methods, 
identifying life-cycle O&S costs, and identifying cost drivers will aid in the accuracy of 
estimates. These measures need to be reevaluated periodically throughout the life of the 
system (GAO, 2010). By using the GCU’s historical data, we hoped to highlight the 
factors affecting the GCU as well as use the lessons we learned from the GCU’s data to 
build a model that will aid in the accuracy of future calculations for other systems and 
their components. 
Our research and findings are not intended to design a new activity-based cost 
system. However, there are lessons and approaches that activity-based costing uses that 
help provide a good product and information that leads to the formulation of a good, 
competitive strategy. In “Measure Costs Right: Make the Right Decisions,” Cooper and 
Kaplan (1988b) explained that costs are categorized and separated so that they can be 
traced back to their origins and show the true cost of the individual component to the 
company. This is extremely important when calculating the O&S costs of a weapon 
system. Understanding and identifying the fully burdened costs associated with the 
weapon system is the only way to identify the support ability of the system and its value-
adding capabilities to the organization. Cooper and Kaplan (1988b) covered the important 
aspect of the cause of distorted data. They explained that current cost systems typically 
overstate costs of high-volume items and understate costs of low-volume items, thus 
providing misleading information and leading to inaccurate decisions (Cooper & Kaplan, 
1988b). A central goal of our thesis is to demonstrate an approach to gathering and 
categorizing costs to facilitate decision-making. We also raise questions about the 
accuracy, or at least the completeness, of that data. 
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3. Identifying the Relevant Data 
 As a result of the Secretary of Defense’s policy on usage of specifications and 
standards, MIL-PRF-49506 (Logistics Management Information) was developed to 
replace MILSTD-1388–2B. It is not a revision of MIL-STD-1388–2B; rather, it 
represents a fundamental change in the way data requirements are levied on contracts. 
MIL-PRF-49506 does not contain any “how to” requirements. The new specification is 
designed to minimize oversight and government-unique requirements (p. 7-2).1 Although 
this manual has been canceled, the DoD’s Military Standard (MIL-STD-1388–1A; 1983), 
a military standard logistic support analysis, is a publication that covered many aspects of 
logistics support. The MIL-STD (DoD, 1983) Task Section 400, Determination of 
Logistics Support Resource Requirements, provided detailed guidance regarding the 
process of assessing the O&S costs that must be considered before a system can be 
adopted and when a new system’s production line is about to be closed. Upon 
examination of the Super Hornets, the DoD utilized the GCU to determine its effective 
service life and the Navy’s measures and processes for changing and adapting a weapon 
system to best combat constantly changing global threats. The MIL-STD (DoD, 1983) 
Section 403 provided guidance for weapon systems reaching the end of their life cycle. It 
identified key areas to assess regarding the system/equipment, such as 
 expected useful life, 
 support requirements, 
 problems associated with inadequate supply after termination of product 
line, and 
 the ability to predict and solve support inadequacies. 
The overall purpose of this instruction is to ensure that all aspects of a weapon 
system are considered before it is implemented, extended, or changed and that the 
appropriate data is collected during the life of the system so that the appropriate decisions 
can be made. We considered many of the same metrics outlined in Section 400 (DoD, 
1983), such as identifying 
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 logistics support resource requirements for each task, 
 new or critical logistics support resource requirements, 
 participants in the support process and their required resources, 
 effects of new strains on weapon systems, 
 estimations of the life of aging components, and 
 reductions in O&S costs. 
Utilizing the data provided, we hoped to classify areas that can be identified as 
key causal factors or metrics that can be better used to identify and explain O&S costs 
associated with the system. The MIL-STD (DoD, 1983) provided us with a good starting 
point and guidance regarding the current system used. 
Accurate forecasting of the demand for spare parts is vitally important for 
maintenance, but the sporadic nature of demand makes accurate forecasting difficult 
(Hua, Zhang, Yang, & Tan, 2007). Hua et al.’s (2007) study centered on how excess 
inventory of spare parts increases costs and how important it is to manage these costs that 
come from holding inventory and from inadequate inventory controls.  They described 
the case of a Chinese company that held spare inventory of approximately $12 million 
out of $21 million total inventory with a turnover of 0.58 times per year. While we did 
not attempt to develop a forecasting model for spare parts, the Hua et al. (2007) study 
showed how  spare parts  affect O&S estimations and demonstrated that effective sparing 
levels are necessary for cost-effective management of maintenance processes.  To have 
effective sparing levels, the Navy must capture accurate and relevant maintenance data at 
the O&I levels. 
4. Establishing Measures  
The United States Marine Corps is growing increasingly concerned about 
expenditures generated from the O&I levels; moreover, Romero and Elliott (2009) 
believed efforts to reduce budgetary impact on O&S must be taken before it is to late. 
Romero and Elliott (2009) began their thesis, Developing a United States Marine Corps 
Organizational and Intermediate Level Maintenance Performance Cost Model, by noting 
a multitude of O&S cost drivers, such as inventory, operating tempo (OPTEMPO), and 
equipment age, procurement costs that are not within the scope of decision-makers. 
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Furthermore, Romero and Elliott (2009) suggested that by developing a method to 
understand and analyze the relationship between cost variations and the continued 
increases in spending, the DoD could support sustainment budgetary requirements in the 
annual funding process. In this manner, budgetary planners could have a more reliable 
way to forecast future budgets, especially during times of monetary uncertainty. Romero 
and Elliott (2009) presented an example about how overestimating inventory has created 
extra spending within the Marine Corps. With the end of operations in Iraq and a 
drawdown over the horizon at Afghanistan, a question must be asked: What is going to 
happen to the inventory built to sustain the wars?  The DoD has created inventories to 
sustain operations, so the question is this: When is the right time to take the foot off the 
gas, particularly when war itself is so unpredictable and may not present an exact final 
day?  Questions like these are extremely important to our project because the costs 
associated with the sustainment of operations can be vastly complex and variable. 
Romero and Elliott (2009) covered the importance of identifying the very aspects that can 
be affected by the lowest level of maintenance. 
According to Dixon (2006) in The Maintenance Costs of Aging Aircraft: Insights 
From Commercial Aviation, a close study of how commercial aircrafts age could help 
military decision-makers understand how “aging effects” affect cost estimation over time. 
In the cost study, Dixon (2006) covered three separate linear regressions by computing 
age effects on (1) aircraft ages zero to six years old, (2) aircraft ages six to 12, and (3) 
aircraft ages 12 and older. Dixon (2006) displayed the results of the RAND study as 
follows: Group 1 shows a maintenance increase cost rate of 17.6% per year; Group 2 
displays an annual increase rate of 3.5% per year; and Group 3 yields a surprising 0.7% 
increase per year. Dixon (2006) also explained that organizations must assume a rapid 
constant increase in cost with age; however, other studies showed that such assumptions 
are incorrect. Furthermore, the reason that the younger aircraft result is higher than the 
rest is due to a cost shift from manufacturer-provided maintenance to owner-provided 
maintenance after the warranties have expired (Dixon, 2006). Dixon’s point was that 
leadership in the military must spot such changes while projecting future budgets not as a 
linearly increasing cost but as a midway point at which costs need to be reevaluated. 
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Utilizing flight hours to calculate the life of an airframe and its components is the 
most widely used and accepted method of measurement. A linear relationship is assumed 
to exist, along with the assumption that all parts on the aircraft have constant failure rates. 
These assumptions do not factor into the age of the weapon system or components or into 
the change in mission or utilization of the weapon system and its components. In our 
analysis of the GCU’s data, we hoped to identify trends in the failure rates and make 
correlations to the age and/or utilization of systems that the GCUs support. In A Method 
for Forecasting Repair and Replacement Needs for Naval Aircraft: Phase II, DeLozier 
and Wilkinson (1986) defined the variables that could be used in a method for forecasting 
repair and replacement needs for naval aircraft Phase II. These variables include the 
replacement rate, fraction recycled, failure rate, and repair rate.  
Delozier and Wilkinson (1986) provided valuable insight to aid our interpretation 
of the current maintenance data. Models such as this need accurate data to predict 
replacement rates. Our analysis examined the data used to determine failure rates and the 
fraction replaced that impact replacement rates and costs.  
Understanding how to identify which costs are fixed and which costs are variable 
is important. This process is complicated further by the mix of funds that the DoD uses to 
cover expenses. Cooper and Kaplan (1988) discussed costing systems that can cloud the 
waters and make it difficult to see what the true expenses are, or how making changes to 
a process or system will affect the costs associated with the program or system a mix of 
funds are intended to support. Understanding the impact of changes and the importance 
of identifying costs, as well as understanding errors in the way that data is recorded and 
interpreted, makes it difficult to form a plan of attack. Data collection systems that are 
easy to use and understand, not only by management but also by the frontline user, 
greatly enhance the accuracy and volume of data collected. The DoD has many systems 
collecting data to form an array of measures. We used multiple sources of data to 
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III. METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCES 
A. METHODOLOGY 
Our results were derived from using Microsoft Excel (“Excel”) to manipulate data 
collected and stored in AFAST and DECKPLATE databases. Excel and our data sources 
are tools available to today’s naval officers. By using tools and data that are available to 
aviation maintenance officers, we hope that our methods can benefit the aviation 
maintenance community by identifying strengths and weaknesses in the data, as well as 
by describing and using methods to make better use of the data collected.  
The data used to calculate the following results was derived from a merging of 
AFAST and DECKPLATE data, starting March 23, 2009, and ending September 30, 
2010. This data range was selected because it represented the current consecutive fiscal 
years that have been completed. By selecting the last two fiscal years, we hoped to 
identify any new trends or tease out information that had not been discovered yet. 
Data from DECKPLATE, a system that NAVAIR maintains in Patuxent River, 
and AFAST, a system which is maintained in San Diego at Commander, Naval Air 
Forces Pacific (COMNAVAIRPAC), requisition and cost data were merged to create a 
single, more detailed database. These separate inputs created the combined product that 
was utilized. The data field DECKPLATE Work Order Info (all) was matched with the 
requisition information in DECKPLATE, then the AFAST cost data was added to match 
the requisition information. The merging of DECKPLATE and AFAST data was 
completed by Mr. Kevin Doyle, a data analyst at Commander Naval Air Forces 
(COMNAVAIRFOR), based on our request. 
Organization of the data was accomplished by extensive use of Excel pivot tables. 
Pivot tables automatically sort, count, total, or give the averages of the data field selected; 
for example, by selecting the merged DECKPLATE and AFAST data, we can easily and 
quickly manipulate the data. Pivot tables make sorting and organizing this large volume 
of information easier and more accurate by removing a majority of the manual data 
manipulation, thus removing the chance for human error in the data entry. Pivot tables 
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can be filtered and re organized until only the data you desire is displayed, for example 
the initial pivot table displays additional filtered data results in a second table (also called 
a pivot table) showing a summary of the selected data. Changes can be made to the 
summary’s structure by dragging and dropping fields graphically. The “rotation,” or 
pivoting, of the summary table gives the concept its name. 
A snapshot of the GCU’s maintenance history is represented by the 5,579 line 
items, each with 80 data fields of information. Seventeen pivot tables were created and 
utilized to filter, organize, and analyze this data. Manually grouping the job control 
numbers (JCN) was completed in order to build our correlation tables. The 5,579 
individual JCNs could be tied to 186 mother JCNs.  
Pivot tables provided the core descriptive statistics that are the central part of our 
analyses. In addition, correlation tools were also used to demonstrate the sorts of post 
hoc, or “what if,” analysis that could be performed by naval aviation professionals if the 
sorts of tables we built in this thesis were made available to them.  We utilized Excel to 
create a Phi correlation to see how often items are ordered together (Cramer, 1946). Phi 
correlations are appropriate for measuring the strength of the association between binary 
(or dichotomous) variables. The Phi correlation coefficient is defined as 
     (1) 
where a is the number of observations in which both variables are coded 1; b is the 
number of observations in which the first variable is coded 1 but the second is coded 0; c 
is the number of observations in which the first variable is coded 0 but the second is 
coded 1; and d is the number of observations in which both variables are coded 0. 
The data used in these correlations is converted from quantities ordered to items 
ordered or not—a binary repression of the data. The correlation is intended to show if 
there was an interaction between parts; for example, if there was a part used to repair the 
GCU, were there any other parts used in conjunction with that part as well. For this 
reason, we changed the data to binary where 1 represents a part that is used to repair the 
GCU and 0 represents the absence of a part being utilized. Excel’s CORREL tool 
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provides an output table with values illustrating the strength of their correlation: +1 
representing items that are perfectly positively correlated and -1 representing items that 
are negatively correlated. Phi correlation tools are not available in Excel so we coded 
them manually using Excel. Phi correlation results were formatted to find the result in the 
same visual representation as Excel’s CORREL tool output table, making it easier to read 
and compare to our results. 
In this project, we took a close look at the costs of aviation, the costs of aviation 
maintenance, and the systems that capture that data. Utilizing the same data sources used 
by the Navy to track and store maintenance information, we tracked parts through the 
maintenance and supply system capturing O-, I-, and depot-level maintenance actions, 
failure rates, and costs. Data sources used by the Navy already capture a large portion of 
the maintenance transaction; by using this data, we identified the strengths and 
weaknesses of the current data system as well as painted a picture of costs associated 
with naval aviation maintenance for a single item.   After exploring accessible online 
database tools such as AFAST, DECKPLATE, and VAMOSC that track historical cost 
data throughout the fiscal year, we used these tools to identify costs and changes that 
contribute to significant cost variations for that item.   
The item we selected was the GCU. By examining the GCU, we focused our data 
collection and analysis. With the GCU’s current high utilization rate and its impact on the 
F/A-18 weapon system, data analysis on the GCU is important for the fleet. Also, 
because there is a great deal of data related to the GCU in our source data sets, we 
ensured that we could extract enough data to demonstrate the usefulness of our 
methodology. 
B. DATA SOURCES 
Aviation maintenance involves a lot of data collection in order to ensure that 
maintenance actions are properly performed and documented. This process is intended to 
provide vital information that is critical to the safety of the aircrew and personnel 
performing maintenance on the aircraft; ensuring accountability, the tracking of parts and 
materials are also functions of this data collecting. By combining the data collected from 
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aircraft that are of the same TMS or that utilize the same parts and materials, the DoD can 
quickly identify trends, anticipate demands, and ensure proper stocking levels. Using a 
combination of data sources utilized by the DoD, we identified the cost of repairable 
components on the Navy across O-, I-, and depot-level maintenance. Section 1 of this 
chapter is a description and reason for the use of the following data systems. 
1. The Navy Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs 
The DoD utilizes information from all Services to make budgetary decisions. The 
Services provide information from a database source called Visibility and Management 
of Operating and Support Cost (VAMOSC). VAMOSC is a management information 
system that collects and reports U.S. Navy and Marine Corps historical O&S costs.   In 
1975, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed all Services to collect actual weapon 
system O&S costs. In 1992, management of the Naval VAMOSC to provide executive 
oversight was assigned to the Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA) and to the OSD 
CAIG. Today, VAMOSC provides data of direct and indirect O&S costs of weapon 
systems; it also provides non-cost information, such as flying hour metrics, age of 
aircraft, and so forth. VAMOSC also contains military personnel databases composed of 
personnel costs and has recently added databases covering DoN civilian personnel and 
Navy facilities physical characteristics and operating costs (VAMOSC, 2012). 
VAMOSC databases are intended as information files to be used in appropriations 
and cost analyses. These data are used to develop the O&S portion of life-cycle cost 
(LCC) and estimate indirect costs for future weapon systems. They also contribute to the 
Navy’s efforts to reduce the total ownership cost (TOC) of legacy and future weapon 
systems. VAMOSC is used to identify significant cost drivers that represent cost 
reduction opportunities (VAMOSC, 2012). 
The VAMOSC (2012) appropriation accounts applicable to the current project are 
as follows: 
 Aircraft Procurement, Navy (APN): procurement of new aircraft, 
modifications to existing aircraft, and spare parts; 
 Other Procurement, Navy (OPN): procurement of ship and aviation 
support equipment, communication and electronic equipment, ordnance 
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support equipment, civil engineer support equipment, supply and 
personnel/command support equipment, and spare and repair parts; and 
 Operation and Maintenance, Navy (O&MN): expenses necessary for 
support of the fleet, civilian employee pay, travel and transportation, 
training, consumable supplies, recruiting and advertising, base operations, 
and base communications and subsistence. 
2. Cost Analysis Improvement Group 
CAIG, now called the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), was 
created as an independent standard cost-estimation parameter utilized by the DoD during 
acquisitions and any cost tracking or estimation event. The CAPE is also consistent with 
DoD regulations and is under administrative control by an appointed DoD official.  
Table 3 was extracted from the VAMOSC website, and it shows the CAPE cost 
elements utilized by cost estimators. The data is historical and is collected from several 
different reliable sources such as military personnel, NAVAIR, and so forth. 
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Constant FY11 Dollars Count
1.1 Operations Manpower  64,716,338.00$                    
1.2 Unit-Level Maintenance Manpower  162,591,916.00$                 
1.3 Other Unit-Level Manpower  33,682,446.00$                    
2.1.1 Energy (POL, Electricity) 297,914,264.00$                 
2.1.2 Training Munitions and Expendable Stores 10,150,936.00$                    
2.2 Support Services 2.2.1 Transportation of Things 3,941,126.00$                      
2.3 Temporary Duty  6,948,334.00$                      
3.1.1 Organization-Level Consumables 72,613,444.00$                    
3.1.3 Organization-Level DLRs 136,440,499.00$                 
3.1.4 Contract Maintenance Services 19,317,686.00$                    
3.2.4 Government Labor 49,474,146.00$                    
3.2.5 Contractor Maintenance
3.3.1 Government Depot Repair 107,804,069.00$                 
3.3.2 Contractor Depot Repair 1,159,562.00$                      
3.3.3 Other Depot Maintenance 2,567,930.00$                      
4.1.1 System Specific Operator Training 2,424,307.00$                      
4.1.2 System Specific Non-Operator Training 2,345,326.00$                      
4.4 Sustaining Engineering and Program Management  14,047,932.00$                    
4.5 Other Sustaining Support  846,207.00$                         
5.0 Continuing System Improvements 5.1 Hardware Modifications or Modernization  154,551,948.00$                 
A1.1 Regular Aircraft Number A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number - Navy 133
A1.2 FRS Aircraft Number A1.2.1 FRS Aircraft Number - Navy 72
A2.1 Regular Total Annual Flying Hours A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours - Navy 50,875
A2.2 FRS Total Annual Flying Hours A2.2.1 FRS Annual Flying Hours - Navy 19,185
A5.1 Barrels of Fuel Consumed - Regular A5.1.1 Barrels of Fuel Consumed - Regular - Navy 1,538,101
A5.2 Barrels of Fuel Consumed - FRS A5.2.1 Barrels of Fuel Consumed - FRS - Navy 569,318
P1.1 Operations Personnel Count  475
P1.2 Maintenance Manpower Count  2,461
P1.3 Other Personnel Count  495
P2.1 Intermediate Personnel Count - Maintenance  577
P2.2 Intermediate Personnel Count - Other  20










4.1 System Specific Training
A1.0 Total Aircraft Number
A2.0 Total Annual Flying Hours
A5.0 Total Barrels of Fuel Consumed
P1.0 Unit-Level Total Personnel Count
P2.0 Total Intermediate Personnel Count
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The following are level elements as defined by CAIG (2007):2 
1.0 Unit3-level manpower includes the costs of all operators, maintenance, 
and other support manpower at operating units. Unit-level manpower costs 
are intended to capture direct costs (i.e., costs of unit-level individuals that 
can be clearly associated with the system performing its intended defense 
mission). It includes MilPers costs (e.g., basic pay, allowances, 
entitlements, etc.).  
1.2 Unit-level maintenance manpower is the cost of all military, civilian, 
and contractor manpower that performs unit–level maintenance on a 
primary system, associated support equipment, and unit-level training 
devices.   
1.3 Other unit-level manpower is the cost of all military, civilian, and 
contractor manpower that performs administrative, security, logistics, 
safety, engineering, and other mission support functions at the unit level.  
3.0 Maintenance includes the costs of labor (outside of the scope of the 
unit level) and materials at all levels of maintenance in support of the 
primary system, simulators, training devices, and associated support 
equipment.4 
3.1 Organizational maintenance and support includes the cost of materials 
and other costs used to maintain a primary system, training devices, 
simulators, and support equipment. 
3.1.1 Organization-level consumables include the costs of materials 
consumed in the maintenance and support of a primary system and their 
associated support and training equipment at the unit level. Illustrative 
types of maintenance consumables are coolants and deicing fluids.   
3.1.3 Organization-level Depot Level Repairable (DLR) includes the net 
cost the operating unit incurs for DLR spares (also referred to as 
exchangeable items) used to maintain equipment at the unit level. 
3.1.4 Contract maintenance services includes the separate costs of 
contract labor, materials, and assets used in providing maintenance 
                                                 
2 The CAPE level elements were taken directly from the VAMOSC user manual and are in accordance with 
DoDI 5000.02 and DoD 5000.4M.  The elements display costs that are followed by the DoD while 
describing money estimates for various programs because they bring essential understanding to the true 
cost of a system as a whole. 
3 Unit, in the purpose of this MBA project, can be defined as a squadron- or organizational-level command. 
4 This cost is tracked by Numbers JCNs and order documents generated at the O-level. 
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services to a weapon system, subsystem, support equipment, training 
device, or simulator at the unit level. 
3.2 Intermediate maintenance includes the cost of labor and materials and 
other costs expended by I-level maintenance organization in support of a 
primary system, simulators, training devices, and associated support 
equipment. Where I-level maintenance activities cannot be separately 
identified from O-level maintenance, the costs are often combined as 
either organizational or intermediate maintenance. 
3.2.4 Government labor includes the costs (using DoD standard composite 
rates, or hourly equivalent) of military and government civilian manpower 
that performs intermediate maintenance on a primary system, simulators, 
training devices, or associated support equipment at I-level maintenance 
activities. 
3.3 Depot maintenance includes the fully burdened cost of labor, material, 
and overhead incurred in performing major overhauls or other depot-level 
maintenance on a system, its components, or other associated equipment at 
centralized repair depots, contractor repair facilities, or on site by depot 
teams.  
3.3.1 Government depot repair includes government labor, material, and 
support service costs for depot repair. 
3.3.2 Contractor depot repair includes the separate costs of burdened 
contract labor, material, and assets used in providing maintenance services 
to a primary system, subsystem, or associated support equipment. If 
possible, labor, material and other costs should be displayed separately. 
3.3.3 Other depot maintenance costs not otherwise included. For example, 
this could include second-destination transportation costs for weapons 
systems or subsystems requiring major overhaul or rework, special testing, 
environmental costs, transportation of field repair teams, and technical 
assistance that is unique to the system and not included elsewhere in the 
estimate. 
4.0 Sustaining support includes support services provided by centrally 
managed support activities external to the units that own the operating 
systems.  
4.1.2 System-specific non-operator training includes the costs of advanced 
system-specific training associated with maintenance and other support 
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3. Decision Knowledge Programming for Logistics Analysis and Technical 
Evaluation 
DECKPLATE is a new reporting system based on the Cognos incorporated 
analysis, query, and reporting tools. It provides report and query capabilities content-
equivalent with the current Naval Aviation Logistics Data Analysis (NALDA) systems 
and allows reporting and analysis capability not available with the current systems. The 
new web-based reporting system provides a sound basis for future implementation of 
emerging DoN architectural requirements. DECKPLATE is the next generation data 
warehouse for aircraft maintenance, flight, and usage data. The system provides a web-
based interface to a single source of the information currently being stored in multiple 
NALDA systems. Through the use of Cognos analysis, query, and reporting tools, the 
user has the capabilities to effectively obtain readiness data in a near real-time 
environment, as well as history data for trend analysis and records reconstruction 
(NAVAIR, 2012). 
Figure 2 displays data flow and how DECKPLATE serves as a centralized data 
warehouse of all current aviation systems under the NAE.   
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Figure 2.   DECKPLATE Data Flow 
(DoN, 2012) 
4. Aviation Financial Analysis Tool 
AFAST was developed as a result of a study conducted at COMNAVAIRPAC in 
1994 by 23 reserve officers who were chief executive officers (CEOs) or chief financial 
officers (CFOs) in their civilian capacity. They were tasked by Vice Admiral Spane to 
advise him on how better to run COMNAVAIRFOR and COMNAVAIRPAC like a 
business. One of the study group’s conclusions was that while COMNAVAIRPAC’s 
financial tracking and analysis were up to industry standards, there was no cost 
management applied to the flying hour program (FHP). Their study had identified two 
tools already in existence in the fleet that could be used as a source of data to build a cost 
management system at COMNAVAIRPAC. Their recommendation was to develop 
AFAST using those systems as data sources. The two systems identified were the 
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Aviation Store Keeper Information Tracking (ASKIT) system and Naval Aviation 
Logistics Command Management Information System (NALCOMIS) AIMD Cost 
Accounting (NACA) system. ASKIT was selected to provide flight hours and fuel costs 
accumulated monthly by squadron and reported via the budget operating target report 
(BOR). NACA input files, extracted from the NALCOMIS, were selected as a source of 
squadron and AIMD costs via the requisition and maintenance action form (MAF) data. 
The reserve group was tasked to develop a prototype at Naval Air Station North Island. 
The prototype evaluation was completed in October 1995, and the decision was made to 
implement the system in all COMNAVAIRPAC activities that were supported by the 
NALCOMIS within the AIMD. The implementation was completed in 1996, and training 
was provided by the reserve group to the COMNAVAIRPAC staff. The original AFAST 
software was developed by the reserve group and supported by a contract with the Naval 
Computer and Telecommunications Station (NCTS) in San Diego, CA. This contract 
ended at the close of fiscal year 1996, and subsequent support and development has been 
provided via a commercial contractor (NAVAIR, 2012). 
The AFAST program was monitored by the COMNAVAIRPAC FHP Executive 
Steering Committee (ESC) to track the progress of cost reduction initiatives that were 
undertaken. The ESC decided in fiscal year 1999 to involve the type wings in monitoring 
the FHP costs in their respective type model aircraft. Training was provided to the type 
wings, and additional tools were developed to support the wing involvement. The original 
tool (AFAST User) was enhanced, and two new tools were developed. The two new tools 
were the Type Wing FHP Cockpit Chart and the TWING Detail Analysis tool. All 
exported tools have been developed as Excel spreadsheets or Microsoft Access databases 
to ensure Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) compatibility and compliance. The master 
AFAST database is maintained at COMNAVAIRPAC on a dedicated file server. This 
database is updated and maintained by AFAST contractors and used to produce the other 
tools monthly. These tools are produced after the flight hours have been certified in the 
comptroller’s Aviation Cost Evaluation System (ACES), which is the official financial 
reporting system used to produce the Flying Hour Cost Report. AFAST draws the BOR 
data from ACES after certification. AFAST captures only direct maintenance costs as 
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documented via Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) NALCOMIS. These costs are 
the results of squadron and IMA requisitions generated in the NALCOMIS and MAF 
data used to identify BCM actions on repairable items. AFAST does not capture 
financial-only transactions. These transactions include contract costs, financial 
adjustments, carcass charges, and requisitions not submitted via the NALCOMIS. The 
business rule established at inception was that AFAST must capture 85% of costs to be 
an effective cost-management tool. Currently, AFAST captures approximately 90% of 
FHP costs (AFAST, 2009). 
C. DESCRIPTION OF DATA FIELDS USED 
1. Job Control Number  
The JCN is a 9-to-11 alphanumeric character number utilized to identify different 
jobs conducted on the aircraft. The JCN is the main master data record (MDR) or 
document utilized to track maintenance procedures and material discrepancies and to 
order parts and materials. It contains information such as man-hours, order document 
numbers, and all other fields described in the data fields. It also provides a link between 
maintenance actions performed at I-level in support of the maintenance discrepancy 
initiated under a particular JCN. There is only one JCN per repairable item; conversely, 
there can be several consumable items ordered tracked under one JCN. An original JCN 
would follow a set format that is separated into four sections.   
 First, a three-digit code that identifies the originating command. This code 
is known as the ORG code.  
 Second, a three-digit Julian date to identify when the JCN was created.  
 Third, a three-digit serial number to identify, in sequence, the actual job 
number.  
 Fourth, the suffix, or SUF, to identify a subassembly or sub-subassembly 
repair actions performed independently of the major component repair and 
used only for I-level maintenance actions.   
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For example, a repairable component, such as the GCU, will have a JCN (e.g., 
AD6259018). If there is another repairable part needed to fix the GCU at the I-level, then 
a suffix would be added at the end of the original JCN (e.g., AD62590181A). Therefore, 
by looking at the JCN, we can see whether there were other actions taken to repair the 
part; moreover, we can identify other repairable components utilized to fix the original 
subassembly (DoN, 2012). 
Figure 3 is a visual example of how a JCN looks, starting with the original job 
and any other parts to support it. 
 
Figure 3.   Job Control Number Representation 
 
The JCN data was dispersed throughout DECKPLATE and AFAST. Each JCN 
was in its own individual row, as expected; nonetheless, it created a complication while 
trying to find and group main JCNs with its associated SUF. Therefore, we created a 
pivot table that displayed the JCNs as the “row label” and National (or North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization [NATO]) item identification number (NIIN), EXTPRICE in the 
values columns. Once the original pivot table was set, we had to organize the JCNs first 
in ascending order and finally group the SUF with the original JCN. For grouping, we 
utilized the group row function from Excel. At the end of the process, we had several 
rows of JCNs and their corresponding SUF. The new JCN pivot table was easier to read, 
and it showed the different charges against the original JCN, which also represents 
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charges against the GCU. Another benefit of the JCN pivot table was that adding the 
NIIN field to the row label will display the NIINs ordered against the original JCN; in 
other words, it displays the parts required to fix the GCU.                       
Nevertheless, manually grouping the JCNs was a long and tedious task that is not 
practical to maintenance officers in the fleet. However, there is a great deal of 
information that can be gained by looking at this set. 
2. Type Equipment Code 
The type equipment code (TEC) is a four-digit character code used to identify the 
complete end item or category of equipment being worked on. This number is used to 
identify the TMS involved (DoN, 2012). Using the TEC code to filter the data, trends in 
specific systems common to a variety of aircraft can be found. For example, in our data, 
TEC codes were used to organize groups of aircraft with identical configurations. The 
GCUs found in the FA-18 are used in the following variants: F/A-18E, F/A-18F and F/A-
18G. The F/A-18G is the electronic counter measure variant of the F/A-18, designed to 
replace the EA-6B. Once the data is grouped by TEC codes, it is easy to identify which 
group of aircraft, if any, is experiencing the highest number of failures per aircraft. In our 
data, we found that the F/A-18E is experiencing roughly 13 failures per aircraft over the 
time frame covered by our data. This is the highest number of failures per aircraft 
compared to the other TMSs involved. 
3.  Commercial and Government Entity 
Commercial and Government Entity (CAGE) is a five-position code assigned to 
manufacturers and non-manufacturers, organizational entities, and contractors of items 
procured by agencies of the federal government. These codes help identify who 
manufactured the part (DoN, 2012).  
4. Action Taken 
Action Taken (AT) Code A is a one-character alphabetic or numeric code that 
describes what action has been accomplished on the item identified by a Work Unit Code 
(WUC). These codes include the multiple categories of BCMs as well as information 
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regarding the repair (DoN, 2012). The AT code provides the ability to sort GCUs that 
were repaired from the GCUs that were BCM. 
Using AT codes as the sorting data field in a pivot table and then pairing that 
information to the maintenance activity performing maintenance on the parts via the 
“action origination short name” (a data field used in DECKPLATE) will produce a 
consolidation of the data sorted by groups under each maintenance activity; this provides 
a summary of man-hours, parts ordered, and associated costs for each site. For example, 
we could instantly see that of the 1,388 “BCM1 – repair not authorized,” four of them 
were issued by the AIMD onboard the USS Ronald Regan. By organizing the data this 
way, the total number of items processed for each AT code as well as the associated man-
hours can also easily be identified.  
5. Beyond Capable Maintenance 
BCM is a term/code used by I-levels when repair is not authorized at that level or 
when an activity is not capable of accomplishing the repair because of a lack of 
equipment, facilities, technical skills, technical data, or parts (DoN, 2012). BCM is also 
used when shop backlog precludes repair within the time limits specified by existing 
directives. BCM codes are used to identify quantities and reasons for GCUs to be sent off 
for depot-level repair. 
6. A National Item Identification Number 
A NIIN is a nine-digit numeric code that uniquely identifies an item of supply in 
the NATO Codification System (DoN, 2012). NIINs allow us to filter and identify each 
component and the number of components used to repair the GCU. NIINs are extremely 
important while using pivot tables because the information associated with the individual 
NIIN represents quantitative factors such cost in dollars, man-hours, and items ordered. 
This information provided us with means to identify cost drivers, frequently ordered 
items, and also man-hours expended while repairing GCUs. Therefore, by using the 
NIIN, we could see which of the internal components was failing, how often, and how 
much it cost to repair.  
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7. Malfunction Description Code 
A malfunction description code (MAL) is a three-character numeric or 
alphanumeric code used to describe the malfunction occurring on or in an item identified 
by a WUC (DoN, 2012). Filtering the data by MAL codes, counting the number of times 
a specific MAL code is used, then organizing the MAL codes by number of re-
occurrences is a fast and easy way to see trends in specific types of failures. For example, 
374 is the code representing an internal failure. This code appeared 1,043 times, far more 
times than any other code. This information can be used as the first step to identifying 
when the components are failing internally. These codes are utilized throughout the 
maintenance process and vary as new discrepancies are found and are documented 
against the part being repaired. 
8. Measures of Maintenance Hours 
a. Elapsed Maintenance Time 
Elapsed maintenance time (EMT) measures the duration of an event from start to 
completion, regardless of the number of personnel performing the maintenance (DoN, 
2012). 
b. Man-Hours 
Man-hours are used to measure the time that each individual spends to complete a 
single discrepancy (DoN, 2012). 
9. Serial Numbers 
Removed/installed equipment serial numbers are located on the part and are 
entered into maintenance data systems for record keeping. We used these numbers to 
keep track of how GCUs are moved through the maintenance and supply systems (DoN, 
2012). Tracking these serial numbers could be useful to find individual component 
failures. For example, if there is an internal component that fails continuously, it 
demonstrates that the particular component has a high rate of failure; this also means that 
to maintain a desired level of readiness, an organization will require an increased 
availability of that component. Conversely, if the component is not identified as a high 
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failure component by looking at different maintenance organizations, we could conclude 
that there is another factor creating the failure. Using serial numbers as the sorting data 
field in a pivot table could shed light on internal failures that are affecting other internal 
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IV. RESULTS 
Our analysis focused on providing information associated with costs that are 
followed and used by the DoD to describe financial estimates for various programs.  Our 
hope was to provide an essential understanding of the true cost associated with a system 
and its subsystems, as well as to increase the accuracy and detail of the data used by 
CAPE and other cost analysis groups during acquisition and budget estimation. The 
results obtained by our analysis were from AFAST and DECKPLATE data fields and 
relate and influence current level elements as defined by CAPE. 
A. JOB CONTROL NUMBERS 
A JCN is the main MDR; thus, it creates the means to track all maintenance 
actions back to the original job. A SUF JCN is added in order to accommodate an I-level 
action. These SUF JCNs represent additional actions, parts, and materials that are 
required to repair the system associated with the main JCN, such as ordering a repairable 
part to repair a GCU. Excel views the SUF JCNs as individual JCNs that are not part of a 
mother JCN; thus, manually grouping JCNs by the authors became a necessary evil. 
Table 4 displays an example of a pivot table that groups SUF JCNs into the original JCN. 
JCNs are extremely useful in this regard because the ability to track the parts and 
materials to the original discrepancy helps to tell the story; however, the tools in Excel do 
not automatically group JCNs together. 
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Table 4.   Pivot Table for Job Control Numbers 
  
Interesting contrasts were discovered by comparing different commands. During 
the analysis of the JCN tables, such as the comparison between Strike Fighter Squadrons 
VFA-143 deployed on the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower and Strike Fighter 
Squadrons VFA-14 deployed on the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz, we found the following 
information while using pivot tables. The tables were showing marginal differences in 
cost, which was expected since parts cost the same; however, there was a large difference 
regarding total man-hours, especially at the I-level or AIMD. While both had ordered 
almost the same amount of parts for a relatively equal cost, they did not have the same 
amount of hours. Table 4 compares two different JCNs: the main JCN from the USS 
Nimitz AIMD accounted for 3,795 total man-hours, contrasted with 148 hours executed 
by the USS Eisenhower AIMD. As we know, man-hours add cost to the GCU or any 
other components because of the manpower requirements. We decided to add ordering 
dates and received dates to the tables so that we could see how long it took to repair the 
component.   We found that only those parts that were not received the same date had 
man-hours. In accordance with the NAMP, man-hours measure the time that each 
individual spends to complete a single discrepancy, so we were surprised to see zero 
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hours on parts that were received the same day. The example on Table 4 shows a time 
frame of 45 days. At the same time, there are exactly 345 man-hours for each part. We 
thought that the 345 hours represented the time that AIMD took to repair that particular 
subcomponent; for example, the time it took to fix a circuit card. However, when looking 
at a part common to both JCNs, NIIN 01–479–3633, we noticed that this part was a 
packing, which is a consumable part rather than a repairable item. We believe that these 
hours represent an awaiting time lapse rather than hours spent by maintenance personnel 
doing repairs. We came to that conclusion because the other parts that were received the 
same day have zero hours.  Furthermore, the evidence of several consumable items with 
the same times as each other clearly indicates that those hours were not spent in repairing 
those individual components. Inaccurate representation of man-hours affects the accuracy 
of manning, over documentation of man-hours will inflate manning, and under 
documentation will reduce manning and drastically affect readiness. Getting these 
numbers correct is extremely important to personnel cost allocations and to the DoD 
financial and operational planning. 
B. TYPE EQUIPMENT CODE 
TECs were used to distinguish variants in weapon systems and the associated 
failure rates specific to that system. For example, the GCUs’ high failure rate has become 
a problem for the F/A-18, and therefore, identifying the cause of the decreased MTBF is 
important to correcting the problem. Using the TECs and JCNs, we can determine the 
number of maintenance actions being performed to correct GCU discrepancies. Table 5 
illustrates how we can determine which variant is experiencing the greatest rate of failure 
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Table 5.   Type Equipment Code, Job Control Number, and Aircraft Count Used to 
Determine Percentage of Failures 
 
 
The TECs can provide a starting point for determining the cause of increased 
failures. As seen in Table 5, the F/A-18E has the greatest percentage of failures, which 
makes it a good place to start examining the cause of GCU failures.  
C. ACTION TAKEN CODES 
AT codes provide an easy way to identify how discrepancies were corrected or 
whether the required repair was beyond the capabilities of the repairing activity. The AT 
code provides information regarding the reason that the receiving activity cannot repair 
the part. Similarly, BCM codes and cannibalization codes are particularly important to 
cost identification. The costs associated with BCMs are inorganic and typically high, 
whereas cannibalizations represent a failure in the supply system, causing unnecessary 
additional maintenance hours to be performed. 
Table 6 provides a short definition of each AT code currently used as well as the 
number of times that each code was used in the data sample we analyzed. Table 6 also 
highlights the maintenance hours executed before a part was considered BCM, 
maintenance hours executed to repair GCUs, and maintenance hours executed on the 










AMAH 2606 199 F/A‐18E 13.10  
AMAJ 2800 245 F/A‐18F 11.43  
AMAK 172 66 E/A‐18G 2.61    
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Table 6.   Action Taken Codes Used to Illustrate Beyond Capability of 




When analyzing AT codes, we can easily see how our ability to repair and/or 
maintain adequate inventory levels drastically affects time spent repairing weapon 
systems. Using AT codes, comparisons between maintenance activities can be made. For 
example, VFA-143 and VFA-103, aboard the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
and VFA-14 and VFA-41, aboard the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz, were deployed during 
roughly the same time frame and experienced very similar operational tempos. VFA-143, 
a squadron of F/A-18Es, cannibalized 46 GCUs, accounting for 298 maintenance hours, 
and VFA-103, a squadron of F/A-18Fs, cannibalized 23 GCUs, which accounted for 99 
maintenance hours—totaling 69 cannibalized GCUs and 397 maintenance hours. These 
data allow you to compare maintenance practices, operations, flight hours flown, and 
other variables between the two commands. Similarly, VFA-14, a squadron of F/A-18Es, 
cannibalized 32 GCUs, accounting for 205 maintenance hours and VFA-41, a squadron 
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totaling 54 cannibalized GCUs and 424 maintenance hours. Not only can you compare 
squadrons assigned to a carrier or battle group but also across battle groups or theaters of 
operation. Comparisons are not limited to cannibalizations. For example, the AIMD 
onboard the USS Dwight. D. Eisenhower assigned a BCM1 status to 112 GCUs and its 
associated components. Meanwhile, the AIMD onboard the USS Nimitz assigned a 
BCM1 status to 32 GCUs and its associated components. These comparisons invoke 
further questions and form the basis for future research questions, such as what are 
AIMDs or squadrons doing differently, how are their operations affecting the system, and 
are the failures being caused by environmental factors or human error? 
D. MALFUNCTION CODES 
Malfunction codes can be used to identify trends in the types of failures. They are 
limited to the list of codes available and allow groups of similar malfunctions to be 
pooled together. The more specific or descriptive the code is, the more useful it becomes. 
Using the GCU’s data, we can easily see that internal failures are responsible for the 
greatest number of failures. This may not be enough to fix the problem, but it helps to 
narrow the search. This empowers the user to analyze subcomponents of the whole 
assembly and pinpoint the individual component that is failing. Thus, malfunction codes 
can guide future research and examination of supporting data needed to solve the 
problem. 
E. NATIONAL ITEM IDENTIFICATION NUMBER 
NIINs are extremely useful; while common names, nomenclatures, and even part 
numbers vary from organization to organization, the NIIN associated with that 
component does not. Organizing the data by NIINs allows us to see which components 
are being ordered to repair the weapon system. NIINs can be filtered in a number of 
ways. For example, by using the GCU’s data, we filtered NIINs to show the number of 
repairable and consumable components ordered. We then organized these lists into two 
groups: total number ordered and total cost. 
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Table 7 displays the top 10 consumable items. Table 8 displays the top 10 
repairable parts used to repair the GCU. Items on each table are arranged by greatest to 
least number of units ordered and display their costs. 
Table 7.   Top 10 Consumable Parts Organized by Number Ordered 
 
Table 8.   Top 10 Repairable Parts Organized by Number Ordered 
 
 
From Tables 7 and 8, we can see how NIINs represent the frequency of items 
ordered during a selected period to sustain repairs on a GCU. This information is used to 
calculate future inventories and help maintenance professionals see trends in items that 
are being consumed at a higher rate than normal. More importantly, tracking the number 
of NIINs being ordered and understanding the failure rates of the individual components 
could point out the need to rework or repair the faulty components that are causing the 
larger, more expensive weapon systems to fail. By organizing the NIINs into ordering 
Nomen NIIN Number Ordered Total Cost
O‐RING 010050515 181 276.25$    
O‐RING 001651942 127 42.71$      
O‐RING 011192008 75 246.69$    
TERMINAL 009507783 73 2,312.17$
PACKING 012223502 52 27.90$      
O‐RING 001660990 51 26.37$      
O RING 000546940 38 13.78$      
FILTERING DI 012217808 21 162.45$    
GCU COVER 015526291 17 808.94$    
F18 E/F G1 KI LLPOZ5436 13 0.13$         
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activities, pivot tables can help explore this data more precisely, thus helping to eliminate 
outliers in the reparable components ordered. For example, looking at Table 7, the 
number one consumable ordered is an O-ring. Deeper expansion of the pivot table shows 
that VFA-32 ordered 42 of the 181 O-rings—more than double the amount ordered by 
any other unit. By utilizing this information, some assumptions can be made; VFA-32 
could be ordering more than the amount required to build up their inventory of 
consumable parts,  or possibly, 41 O-rings failed before they were able to install a good 
one. Using the same data sample, the second highest consumable part ordered can be 
examined: once again, VFA-32 ordered 42 O-rings—over double the amount ordered by 
any other unit. Depending on the actual reasons for the quantities ordered, this 
information could be used to eliminate both sets of O-rings as a major cause of GCU 
failures across the fleet. Conversely, the top repairable components ordered from Table 8 
were the power supplies. By further examining that NIIN, we see that FRC Oceana and 
FRC Lemoore ordered 77.52% of that NIIN. FRC Oceana and FRC Lemoore are the only 
two major shore-based repair facilities for the F/A-18. This information further supports 
examination of the power supply because of the total amount ordered.   
Table 9 displays the top 10 consumables. Table 10 displays the top 10 repairable 
components, including GCUs. These tables are organized by the total dollar amount that 
each item represents within the data period used. 
Table 9.   Top 10 Consumable Parts Organized by Total Cost of Items Ordered 
 
 
Nomen NIIN Number Ordered Total Cost
SWITCH,PRESS 014938784 4 2,690.28$
TERMINAL 009507783 73 2,312.17$
CABLE ASSEMB 014080385 1 2,233.66$
SOLENOID,ELE 008681880 1 1,796.20$
COUPLING 011506744 10 1,455.66$
ADAPTER,SPLI 010330117 1 1,187.22$
RELAY,ELECTRO 011208774 1 1,022.72$
CONNECTOR,PLU LLP234788 1 1,000.00$
GCU COVER 15526291 17 808.94$    
CONNECTOR,R 011632549 1 429.16$    
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Table 10.   Top 10 Repairable Parts Organized by Total Cost of Items Ordered 
 
 
Determining cost drivers and the components that have the greatest impact on the 
budget was easy by utilizing NIINs to sort the data.  This was also the same method we 
used to filter Tables 7 and 8.  After examining the cost drivers shown on Table 10, 
additional data mining revealed that FRC Oceana and FRC Lemoore consumed 85.33% 
of the cost associated with the NIIN 015664393—the third highest cost driver to the DoD 
caused by GCU failures. (We started looking there because the top two NIINs represent 
the completed GCU assembly.) Again, because FRC Oceana and FRC Lemoore represent 
the major repair facilities for the F/A-18, this information supports further examination of 
circuit card costs. 
This information about cost drivers supports and increases the accuracy of process 
improvement efforts.  Maintenance professionals can also compare items for the same 
TMS by NIIN in order to identify common items utilized by each command or unit or to 
see if one item is less frequently used elsewhere.  Identifying such trends can lead to the 
information we need to make good decisions regarding system support and 
improvements. 
F. CORRELATIONS 
Utilizing databases like DECKPLATE or AFAST and correlation analysis, 
maintenance professionals can identify positive or negative correlations among repairable 
components. Examining the correlation between components is a way to tease out a weak 
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link in the system, bundle components together when considering safety stocks, and 
reduce the need for independent forecasting. 
Figure 4 displays the top 10 repairable and consumable items ordered to repair 
GCUs. This figure was created using binary or dummy variables (1 if ordered, 0 if not 
ordered) instead of raw data utilized in Tables 7 through 10.  Hence, it shows the most 
frequently ordered items, not the most heavily used items.  The lightly shaded columns in 




Figure 4.   Percentages of Top 10 Items Ordered 
 
With the data organized into dummy variables, we then used the tables to create 
another correlation analysis. This was done for several reasons.  First, the correlations 
provide different sorts of information.  In determining whether a certain kind of fault 
occurs frequently, knowing how frequently parts are ordered together (reported as 
follows) may be more important than knowing whether the amount used varies together 
(reported previously).  Second, the high percentage of zeros (item not ordered) in the 
quantity ordered (the analysis reported previously) tends to distort the strength of the 
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relative frequencies of the four cases that are possible with two parts:  (1) Part A and B 
both used in an order, (2) Part A used but Part B not used, (3) Part B used but Part A not 
used, and (4) neither Part A nor Part B used.  
Figure 4 illustrates the percentage of the time that a part was utilized while 
repairing a single GCU. These are different from the usage percentages.  For example, 
178 power supplies were ordered to repair 1,118 GCUs (representing 16%). When 
converting the dummy variables (frequency ordered) to percentages, we found that power 
supplies are on 18% of orders, as shown in Figure 4.  This is because the raw data 
accounts for the quantity ordered while the dummy variables only track whether an item 
was used (not the quantity used).  The percentage is also higher because some JCNs 
contained more than one generator. In accordance with the NAMP, there should be one 
repairable per JCN; therefore, finding this discrepancy shows a problem in data 
collection.  Similarly, O-Ring 0100515 was 16% in the usage data and 17% in the 
dummy variable form (frequency ordered).  But, not all of the items were different from 
the raw data; the majorities were exact matches and thus helped verify the accuracy of 
our data.  
Based on this analysis, bundling of the repairable parts and the consumable parts 
might be considered.  However, bundling repairable items must be based on a significant 
correlation; otherwise, it could prove costly and inefficient.  The identification of these 
correlations is only the first step in the analysis required to determine which consumable 
parts might be intelligently bundled with repairable items. 
Table 11 illustrates the top 10 items ordered from the data and also shows the Phi 
() correlation between power supply, NIIN 01-479-3818, and electronic card, 01-470-
8685.  The equation shown in the same table is the initial step toward finding the 
significance of the correlation. This example shows that the closer the numbers are to 1, 
the higher their correlation to another component is.  Nonetheless, numbers that are very 
small are not necessarily uncorrelated; the values can be small because of the sheer size 
of our sample. Table 11 also shows the 2x2 table utilized to explain the amount of times 
that an item is present (or not) in a JCN.  For example, the power supply was present in 
149 JCNs out of 2,425 total JCNs. 
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Once Phi is identified, it can be used to calculate the p-value, which will show the 
significance of this correlation.   Since Excel does not have a way to identify p-values for 
Phi, it is helpful to know that according to Cramer (1946), mathematically, Phi^2 is equal 
to Chi^2 divided by n (the sample size) or 2 = /n. Therefore, Phi^2 multiplied by n is 
equal to Chi^2 denoted = 2 * n. This is useful because Excel has a Chi^2 distribution 
formula that shows the statistical significance of the correlation.  
Utilizing the top 10 items ordered, Table 12 shows the p-values derived from Phi 
by using the Excel function “1-CHISQ.DIST (x, deg _ freedom, cumulative),” where x = 
Chi^2, deg _ freedom = 1 (1 is used for any similar 2 x 2 table) and cumulativ e = true.  
The p-value can be interpreted by looking at any intersection in which two parts meet. 
For example, on the top left corner, power supply and O-ring NIIN 01-005-0515 are not 
significantly correlated because there is a 42.7% chance that the times these parts were 
ordered together was just due to random variation, not due to any real relationship in 
usage of the two parts. Conversely, in the top right corner, there is less than a .001% 
chance that the frequency with which power supply and electrical card were ordered 
together was just due to random variation. Therefore, it is safe to say that the two have a 
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Table 11.   Breakdown of Phi Correlation and How It Was Used in Excel 
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The analysis of the correlation also reveals the following: 
First, it is confirmed that O-rings are frequently used, which was also shown by 
Figure 4. Moreover, Figure 4 showed O-ring NIIN 01-005-0515 as the top consumable item 
ordered.  Examining only usage data, we might conclude that a large safety stock of this item 
should be maintained.  However, since previous analysis showed that a single squadron used 
this item heavily, increased safety stocks would not be warranted to support all squadrons, at 
least until the reasons that this squadron had excessive demand are determined.  Also, the Phi 
correlations showed that the usage of this O-ring is significantly correlated to the usage of 
other O-rings, so any spike in demand at one squadron for this one O-ring in isolation is 
especially curious and would need further investigation before safety stocks were adjusted.  
Second, Table 12 shows that by using Phi, the true picture emerges, although the 
correlation is small.  It should be noted that there is still an indication of these parts being 
ordered together, hence the need to observe the failures in parts, such as the electrical card 
and the terminal board, since the correlation is stronger. 
G. VAMOSC 
The VAMOSC database is a great source of information but does not yield usable 
results for the purposes of this project. We tried using Naval Aviation Maintenance 
Subsystem Reports (NAMSRs) directly from the VAMOSC website by using a query data 
under WUC 4211800, 42A1E00, 42A1E90, and 42X1E40 but without success.  When we 
contacted VAMOSC for assistance and provided our specific requirements, VAMOSC 
representatives provided the following fields of data: fiscal year, type/model/series-aircraft, 
NIIN, nomenclature, AVDLR cost, BCM count, I-level consumable cost, depot-level 
consumable cost, total consumable cost, O-level cannibalization count, I-level 
cannibalization count, O-level labor hours, I-level labor hours, and depot-level labor hours.  
However, the lack of subcomponent data at this level rendered this very useful database 
impractical and not worth analyzing for our purposes; With that said, it is hard to understand 
why a component such as the GCU, which is known to have a high failure rate and to 
drastically affect cost and readiness, is not well represented in the data.  By selecting the 
GCU, we had hoped to find large and detailed amounts of data regarding the GCU and the 
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components that it is comprised of because of their impact on the Navy and knowing the 
purpose of acquisition cost analysis systems, such as VAMOSC and the CAPE estimations is 
to project the O&S cost of future weapon systems.  The lack of component and 
subcomponent data suggests these data fields did not include order-level data or man-hours 
utilized, which would have been essential to conduct a diagnostic analysis on cost drivers’ 
estimation for future weapon systems.  Furthermore, we are left with this question: Why is 








The data systems used by the DoD have to be treated as an investment. These systems 
are tools that not only keep spending in the spotlight but also allow maintenance 
professionals to implement cost-avoidance methods.  Those methods, which involve 
observing changes to man-hours, lead-times and cannibalization or consumption rates, are 
necessary to make smart maintenance and budgetary decisions.  Although the MDS already 
provides information available to support a bird’s eye view of combined unit operating cost 
for top tier commands’ decision-making, it denies a comprehensive view of low-level 
commands’ best practices, limiting the ability of the CAPE and other such entities to make 
accurate cost estimations. 
In this thesis, we constructed pivot tables to provide a view of cost and operations 
across the merging of AFAST and DECKPLATE data sets.  We demonstrated the value of 
this multiple-data-set view of the data in several examples. Our ability to organize data from 
multiple sources into groups allowed identification of trends, establishing highs and lows in 
quantities ordered and other useful analyses. The pivot tables we created can isolate dates 
where noticeable changes occur, which can help pinpoint the cause of the change or, at the 
very least, narrow the search.  For example, in a hypothetical scenario, we could assume that 
the AESA’s system installation on the F/A 18, illustrated in Figure 1, represents the root 
cause of the sudden increase of GCU failures. The AESA’s system was installed in 2005, and 
the data range used in our analysis did not cover this time period.  However, we believe that 
the methods we used would support this assumption. 
The answer to our primary research question is equivocal: based on our analysis, data 
systems do not appear to capture all the data necessary for decision-making at the O&I 
levels.  While we were able to find useful information about the GCU at the O&I levels, we 
encountered limitations in the data.  Data from two primary sources were merged; however, 
this merged view still produced an incomplete picture.  The data lacked the necessary detail 
required to accurately predict proper inventories, safety stocks, and costs associated with O-, 
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I-, and depot-level maintenance.  Some data sources that we thought would prove useful 
lacked sufficient granularity to support our analysis. 
Specifically, the consolidation of man-hours, the lack of data regarding awaiting 
maintenance (AWM) times, and the misleading representation of EMT made it difficult, if 
not impossible, to make accurate assumptions regarding safety stocks and inventory levels. In 
regard to the parts and materials being ordered, the data captured, combined with the ability 
to assign that part to a JCN, provided an opportunity to identify trends in failed parts and the 
ability to group them. 
Given our experience in the fleet and knowledge of the data being collected, we 
believe current systems are capturing the necessary data to make cost-effective maintenance 
decisions at the O&I levels; however, as the data is consolidated and pushed upstream, 
critical data fields are left out and are not represented in a consolidated data system.  We had 
hoped that the merging of AFAST and DECKPLATE data would provide the necessary 
information, but it did not; therefore, we cannot definitely say that current data systems 
capture the necessary data to make cost-effective maintenance decisions at the O&I levels. 
B. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS  
We were unable to obtain a DECKPLATE account in order to explore the capabilities 
of the database and verify the current data collected. However, pursuing a DECKPLATE 
account was not necessary because our sponsors at NAVAIR provided pre-filtered data 
containing a merging of databases utilized by the DoD. This data proved to be very useful. 
We would recommend that similar access be made available to all maintenance officers in 
the fleet. This access would provide aviation maintenance professionals with valuable 
information that could be used to improve decision-making and allow a more proactive 
approach to inventory control, logistics, and maintenance support.   
VAMOSC, although a great tool for capturing the cost of major components such as 
the F/A-18 or the F-35, did not provide the same capabilities at the subcomponent level.  For 
example, the F/A-18 TMS CAPE shows costs associated with the TMS at levels starting 
from personnel, labor hours, parts, and overhead, all the way down to the O-level cost of 
parts and materials. However, because a component or subcomponent, such as a mission 
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computer or radar system that is part of the same TMS, would not have the same level of 
detail, it would be unclear what cost is applicable; thus, the possibility of seeing O&S costs at 
the basic component level was not available.  VAMOSC is very useful at capturing detailed 
data at the weapon system level (e.g., the F/A-18 Super Hornet program), as Table 3 shows. 
However, the history of GCU failures cannot be tracked or analyzed with VAMOSC data. 
AFAST’s data is limited to spending, so pairing it with other data is time-consuming 
and difficult.  AFAST did bring additional awareness, raising questions such as the 
following: Why doesn’t your organizations’ spending match other sister commands? Why 
has spending increased on particular items? and, most important, What are others doing right 
so that those better business practices can be implemented across the board? 
AFAST did not contain the same level of detail as DECKPLATE, which is 
understandable because DECKPLATE incorporates more databases into its centralized 
warehouse.  We encountered instances in which data was captured by DECKPLATE but was 
missing from AFAST, even though AFAST should have captured the data.  For example, the 
JCN was located at both databases; however, AFAST had blank fields containing no data. 
Our research could have benefited from more data fields, specifically AWM reason 
codes, which represent a reason for maintenance to stop and accounts for maintenance hours 
between worked maintenance hours. Table 13 is a list of AWM codes and their meaning. 
Table 13.   List of AWM Codes and Their Meaning 
 
 Knowing the times associated with the AWM codes in Table 13 would dramatically 
improve the usefulness of this data. For example, knowing the waiting parts (WP) would 
define how long a system had to wait for parts or materials to arrive before maintenance 
could continue repairing the component. Having this data field and grouping components in 
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this manner would provide better insight when calculating the quantities of materials needed 
to maintain readiness. 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
In conducting our analysis, we found that we needed data from multiple sources, and 
we found data integrity issues that seemed to revolve around data capture, which hampered 
our analysis.  Hence, we recommend removing as much of the manual input to the system as 
possible,  accompanied by the merging of data-collecting sources to tie information together.  
We believe that this is essential to maximizing the use of the vast amounts of data collected 
by the DoD. 
Adopting a data system that works to consolidate collected data would increase the 
number of ways we can compare and measure data. Consolidating data views to facilitate the 
sort of analysis we report in this thesis is an approach that will empower aviation 
maintenance professionals to take a more proactive role instead of the reactive, budgetary 
role currently employed.  Such a system would fill in the gaps we found in our analysis when 
we used AFAST data, and tried to use VAMOSC data. 
Based on our analysis of the data we extracted, we have come to believe that 
maintenance systems in O- and I-level maintenance organizations should be merged and 
completely seamless, and these systems should interact with a single supply system that can 
match locations, dates, and times to materials. These data should be provided in real-time, or 
as close to real-time as possible, throughout a single maintenance and supply system used by 
the DoD. Maintenance hours should not be the only time that is tracked because in-work date 
and date completed do not provide enough information. A supply system that provides the 
time that a part spends in the supply system and all the other steps or stops along the way is 
extremely valuable. These times can be used to calculate wait times and identify bottlenecks. 
These time periods should match maintenance data system times entered for work being 
stopped and/or awaiting parts. Troubleshooting and logistics supporting times must be 
accurately factored in. These seamless systems should be able to provide current as well as 
historic logistics data. 
Knowing when and where parts and materials are, and who is ordering or consuming 
them, can be used to determine whether the process, location, and installation could benefit 
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from consolidation. Maintenance systems need to be designed to track installed components 
and flag their time in service by capturing the service life of components in their intended 
environment. Decision-makers would have the ability to see the MTBF of the components 
that make up the weapon system. This data, in conjunction with accurate lead-times and 
consumption rates, can be used to provide better estimates on safety stocks and improve the 
cost and accuracy of inventory management. 
Naval aviation professionals are proud of the amount and richness of the data 
collected by the fleet. However, we occasionally encountered data that, in our opinion and 
experience as naval maintenance officers, was questionable. We believe that our databases 
are limited by human input errors and missing data fields, thus resulting in significant 
limitations regarding the data available for research. Incorporating more automation in our 
data-collecting system, while keeping no-value-added redundancy out, would reduce the 
chance of human error. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
The DoD has access to all of the information described in this chapter and, for the 
most part, is actively collecting this information in multiple data systems that are not linked. 
It would require extensive amounts of time and money to filter and organize this information 
into useful data, but a data system that could consolidate this information has the potential to 
save time and money. A consolidated system would meet the needs of multiple entities in the 
DoD, from budgeting to manpower, contracting to troubleshooting weapon systems. This 
would be a worthwhile investment that should and can be based off of existing technology. 
This data collection and the interactive analysis tools are essential to all decision-makers 
while implementing cost-related decisions; moreover, these tools could bring the current 
reactive mind-set to a change that would add cost-avoidance techniques initially placed at the 
hands of the leaders at the lowest levels. Our hope is that we have furthered the discussion 
for the extensive use of automated data-collection systems and added to the momentum for 
improved implementations of standardized data-collection and organization processes 
throughout the DoD. 
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